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Introduction 
 
Both UEFA European competitions (the Champions League and Europa League) are 
lucrative revenue streams for association member clubs. However, the prize money 
distributed within each competition is currently inequitable. UEFA distributed a total of 
€904.6m in prize money to all clubs that competed in the Champions League for the latest set 
of figures available (2013/14). The winners of this competition, Real Madrid, earned the most 
in prize money (€57.4m) with the runners up, Atletico Madrid, receiving €50m. It must also 
be noted that the money allocated is not always equal among all the clubs. UEFA distribute a 
certain amount of prize money based on a share they define as the 'market pool'. In this case, 
prize money from the market pool is distributed according to the proportional value of the 
national TV market each individual team represented, among other factors, meaning that the 
amounts distributed varied from country (or national association) to country. Indeed, in 
2013/14 quarter-finalists Paris St. Germain actually earned more in prize money (€54.4m) 
than the runners-up Atletico Madrid. The caveat in the distribution to Paris Saint-Germain is 
that the payment is currently being withheld due to non-compliance with UEFA Financial 
Fair Play (FFP) regulations. 
 
By contrast, the winners of the Europa League in 2013/14 (Sevilla) earned €14.6m in prize 
money whilst the runners up (Benfica) earned €5.3m. This is over €50m less than Real 
Madrid received for winning the Champions League. Differences such as this will make a 
substantial difference to the revenue of a club and clubs that consistently qualify for the 
Champions League are better placed to receive higher amounts of prize money than clubs that 
compete in the Europa League or clubs that do not compete in European competition at all. 
The differences in prize money between the Champions League and Europa League could 
lead to a maintaining of the status quo, particularly in the Champions League, whereby the 
clubs that progress in the Champions League gain more revenue, buy better players, finish in 
a higher position in their respective domestic leagues and gain more UEFA co-efficient 
points, thus enabling them a favourable draw in the group stages. This scenario has 
implications for competitive balance; a focal economic theory surrounding professional team 
sports. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine the competitive balance of the UEFA 
Champions League group stages. By doing so, this study contributes to the literature on this 
topic by examining the competitive balance of a major sport competition that has received no 
research attention to date. As Montes et al. (2014) note a major problem with analysing 
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competitive balance is that there is no precise definition of it. Defining this concept requires 
quantification of the extent of its absence when it exists (Montes et al., 2014). For 
clarification this paper defines competitive balance in line with Downward, Dawson and 
Dejonghe (2009) as the absence of dominant teams(s) monopolising any given sports league 
in which they compete in. 
 
Football finance analysts Deloitte (2013) state that participation in European competitions 
allows clubs to grow revenues from match day receipts and television broadcasting deals, 
which expands the commercial profile of the club. However, Pawlowski, Breuer and 
Hovemann (2010) argued that the modification of the UEFA Champions League pay-out 
system has led to a decrease in competitive balance in the top five European leagues 
(England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). This suggestion is concerning given the 
importance for UEFA to maintain competitive balance within the major European football 
leagues. Thus, analysing the competitive balance of the structure of UEFA’s flagship 
European competition appears warranted. The UEFA co-efficient ranking system for both 
member clubs and countries dictates the seeding system for both the Champions League and 
the Europa League. Currently, the system ranks both member clubs and countries in relation 
to their performance during the last five years. Whilst this is a consistent approach, there is a 
suggestion that this is not the fairest method of ranking and that the resultant effect is a 
decrease in competitive balance in the group and knockout stages of the UEFA Champions 
League. For example, despite winning the English Premier League in the 2011/12 season, due 
to their low UEFA co-efficient score Manchester City FC were placed in a Champions 
League group with three other domestic league champions (Borussia Dortmund, Ajax and 
Real Madrid). This could be considered unfair as ideally a seeding system would benefit the 
best performing teams at that particular time. For example, taking the 2011/12 season into 
account, Manchester City could have been rewarded for winning the English Premier League 
by being placed in a Champions League group with three clubs that did not finish in the top 
two in their respective leagues. In comparison, Manchester United, another English club who 
won the English Premier League in 2012/13 were placed in a Champions League group the 
following season with Bayer Leverkusen (3rd in Bundesliga), Shakhtar Donestk (1st in 
Ukrainian Super League) and Real Sociedad (4th in La Liga). Thus, there are questions 
surrounding the fairness of the current UEFA co-efficient ranking system and whether the 
system could be more focused on clubs short term performance when seeding the 
competition.  
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The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports 
A number of sports economics theorists listed in this section state that the perfect game is a 
symbiotic contest between equally matched opponents. The practical economic problem is 
that professional sports leagues form imperfectly competitive natural cartels where games are 
played between teams with asymmetric market power (Vrooman, 2015). This notion implies 
that dominant teams may only be as strong as their weakest opponent. Comparisons between 
the economic environment of professional team sports and that of more traditional 
commercial businesses have been well documented by sports economists (e.g. Dobson and 
Goddard, 2011; Leach and Szymanski, 2015). Professional team sports are intrinsically 
different from other businesses, in which a firm is likely to prosper if it can eliminate 
competition and establish a position as a monopoly supplier (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). In 
sport, however, it does not pay for one team to establish such a position due to the joint 
nature of 'production' in sports. 
 
Principally, professional team sports are heavily linked to the concepts of uncertainty of 
outcome, competitive balance and profit and utility maximisation (e.g. Buraimo, Frick and 
Hickfang and Simmons, 2015; Fort, 2015; Kesenne, 2015; Leach and Szymanski, 2015; 
Sloane, 2015; Vrooman, 2015). The theoretical literature on the determinants of the degree of 
competitive inequality in sports leagues was developed by US sports economists, with North 
American team sports primarily in mind. Naturally, the development of this literature has led 
to comparisons between the North American and European model (see Hoehn and 
Szymanski, 1999; Andreff and Staudohar, 2000; Sloane, 2006; Szymanski, 2003). The 
European model is and will remain unique, but there appears to be convergence on certain 
features. In both Europe and the United States, sports leagues are joint ventures that can be 
viewed as a single entity or cartel. Clubs are separately owned with discretion to set prices, 
market the games, and adopt strategies to compete with other clubs. There are, however, 
several key differences between the two models, all of which ultimately impinge on factors 
such as revenue generation and ability to compete. For example, the American sports model 
operates a draft system where the best performing rookie is assigned to the worst performing 
team. Furthermore, American sports leagues operate under salary caps, share television 
revenue equally and compete exclusively in domestically structured leagues (aside from a 
handful of Canadian franchises; Andreff and Staudohar, 2000). In place of promotion and 
relegation, evident throughout the European model, changes in American leagues come from 
adding new franchises and relocating franchises to another city.  
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Precisely why such differences have arisen in the two continents has never been fully 
explained (Sloane, 2015). However, Szymanski and Zimbalist (2005) contrast the 
development of football and baseball, with the latter spreading throughout the world. Football 
was influenced by British expatriates and local elites, whilst baseball was much more inward 
looking and concerned with commercial development. Previous literature has suggested that 
profit maximisation is the prime objective of North American leagues and team owners, so 
profitability is the main factor influencing decisions concerning the award of franchises and 
relocation (Dobson and Goddard, 2011). Contrastingly, other authors have proposed that the 
European sports model is more closely related to utility or 'win' maximisation (see Sloane, 
1971; Kesenne, 2000; Garcia-del-Barro and Szymanski, 2006). It must also be noted that very 
few markets can be classified as perfectly competitive or as a pure monopoly (see Gratton 
and Taylor, 2000). The vast majority of firms do compete with other firms, often quite 
aggressively, and yet they are not price-takers. Most markets, therefore, lie between the two 
extremes of monopoly and perfect competition, in the realm of 'imperfect competition'. 
Within this, lies monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The UEFA Champions League is 
most closely related to monopolistic competition as all clubs are essentially selling the same 
product, albeit at different prices. 
 
Both models of professional team sport (European and North American) consider the 
importance of competitive balance in their structure and the implications it may have on 
demand for the 'product'. Indeed, in relation to successful sports leagues, Groot (2008) stated 
that "each competitor has an inherent interest in maintaining the health of their rivals" (p. 25). 
A potential implication in this context is that an excessively imbalanced competition might 
have a negative effect on fan interest and, hence, on demand (Kesenne, 2006; Zimbalist, 
2003). 
 
The concept of competitive balance is also closed linked to the economic theory of 
uncertainty of outcome. Ideally, for there to be uncertainty of outcome, competition is 
required to be close to equal (i.e. either team in any one match has an equal chance of 
winning that match). Uncertainty of outcome not only relates to how one sided a match is 
predicted to be; it can also have a significant effect on gate attendance and, more broadly, 
television viewing figures. For example, as the probability of either team winning approaches 
one, it is possible that gate receipts may fall substantially. Morrow (2003) believed this to be 
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a significant problem for the football industry stating that if viewers perceive games as one-
sided then viewing figures may fall accordingly. 
 
The vast majority of literature surrounding the economics of professional team sports is 
concerned with competitive balance. Indeed, Dobson and Goddard (2011) proclaim that the 
problem of measuring competitive balance within a sports league has attracted considerable 
attention in the academic sports economics literature in recent years. Researchers have 
applied several measures of concentration or inequality, some of which are borrowed from 
industrial economics, to sports teams' win ratio or league points data (Dobson and Goddard, 
2011). 
 
Previous Research on Competitive Balance 
Although the concept of competitive balance has received substantial coverage in academic 
literature, historically, the focus of such studies has been on sports leagues in North America, 
primarily in Major League Baseball, but also in the National Basketball Association, the 
National Football League and the National Ice Hockey League (for examples see: Maxcy and 
Mondello, 2006; Zimbalist, 2002). In more recent years, there have been a number of studies 
that have focused on competitive balance in professional team sports in Europe, most notably 
in football but occasionally in other sports such as rugby union (e.g., Williams, 2012). 
Previous research examining competitive balance in football has almost exclusively focused 
on the so called 'big five leagues' (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) with little 
attention given to football leagues in other European countries (Ramchandani, 2012). Some 
studies detect no significant changes in competitive balance across European leagues (e.g., 
Goossens, 2006: German, French and Spanish first divisions; Groot, 2008: French and 
Spanish first divisions; Koning, 2000: Dutch first division; Michie and Oughton, 2004: 
French first division; Szymanski, 2001: English first division), whilst others report a decline 
in competitive balance (Goossens, 2006: English and Italian first divisions; Groot, 2008: 
English, German, Italian and Dutch first divisions; Montes, Sala-Garrido and Usai, 2014: 
Spanish first division). 
 
There are many indices proposed and employed for measuring competitive balance, a number 
of which can be found in the texts of Groot (2008) and Michie and Oughton (2004). Whilst 
competitive balance in both European football and North American sports has been analysed 
in a number of previous studies to the authors knowledge, no research to date, has examined 
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the competitive balance of the UEFA Champions League group stages. By doing so, this 
study contributes to the literature on this topic by examining the competitive balance of a 
major sport competition that has never previously been researched and offering suggestions 
to possibly improve the competitive balance within the flagship competition in European 
football. In alignment with previous research (e.g., Groot, 2008), it was hypothesised that the 
competition would see a decline in competitive balance. It was also hypothesised that clubs 
seeded in the higher pots would accumulate more points and finish higher in the group stages 
of the competition. 
 
Methodology 
When conducting competitive balance research in professional team sports (see Williams, 
2012), there are normally two main approaches (as also summarised by Booth, 2005); within-
season competitive balance and between-season competitive balance. Measures of within-
season competitive balance tend to include measures such as the Actual Standard 
Deviation/Idealised Standard Deviation ratio (ASD/ISD). This ratio compares the observed 
('actual') standard deviation of win percentage distributions (ASD) in relation to an idealised 
equivalent (ISD) where each team is of equal strength and the probability of winning any 
given match is 0.5. This is represented by the equation ASD/ISD = (0.5)/√N, where N is the 
number of fixtures each team plays in a season. Increases in competitive balance are reflected 
in lower ASD/ISD ratios. This index has been used to examine within-season competitive 
balance in extant research (e.g., Williams, 2012). 
 
For between-season competitive balance two indices of note are the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) and the Competitive Balance Ratio (CBR). The HHI is the sum of the squares of 
the points share for each club contesting a league in a given season. Higher values refer to 
greater concentration, less competition, and more league control held by individual clubs. 
This index has been used to examine between-season competitive balance in extant research 
(e.g., Ramchandani, 2012; Pawlowski et al., 2010). The CBR is a comprehensive measure 
that captures two important competitive balance components (standard deviation of team 
points and standard deviation of league points) and is derived as the average standard 
deviation of team points to the average standard deviation of league points (Humphreys, 
2002). 
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When considering these indices for this study, it became clear that some may not be best 
suited to examine the format of the UEFA Champions League group stage. In particular, the 
ASD/ISD ratio is more useful when considering a larger league made up of more clubs that is 
comparable over time. The UEFA Champions League group stages are decided through 
seeding positions and then a random draw meaning that no one season can ever be considered 
to be comprised of the same clubs playing against each other at the same time. As such, the 
ASD/ISD ratio was discarded as a method of analysis. Similarly, owing to the fact that each 
group only contains 4 teams playing 6 matches each, the CBR was also excluded from the 
analysis as the points totals would be considerably less than would be the case in a full league 
season in a domestic European competition. For these same reasons, other measures of 
competitive balance such as the top 25% concentration ratio (C25%) and the top 50% 
concentration ratio (C50%)  would not be suitable for the analysis. Subsequently, the HHI 
was used to examine the differences in the competitive balance of the group stages between-
seasons before further statistical tests were carried out to account for the influence of the 
seeding system on subsequent performance. 
 
Data Analysis 
Data was collected for all UEFA Champions League group stages since the number of clubs 
participating increased to 32 in the 1999/2000 season up until 2013/2014, providing 15 years 
of data. The data collected included seeding, points accumulated and final position in the 
group stages of the competition for all clubs in each of the 15 years studied. To examine 
hypothesis 1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was employed to examine the competitive 
balance of the eight groups of the UEFA Champions League group stages. The average HHI 
for each season was used to examine competitive balance over the 15 seasons. 
 
Hypothesis 2 was examined using one way ANOVAs with Welch correction for each 
independent variable. Post-hoc tests with Scheffé correction were employed to follow up 
significant ANOVA effects. For all analyses α was set at .05.  
 
Results 
The results for the HHI for the UEFA Champions league demonstrate that whilst the scores 
for each season fall into the concentrated range of business market share, the gradual increase 
in HHI for the group stages of the competition appears to have become more imbalanced (see 
figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Competitive balance of UEFA Champions League group stages for seasons 1999-
2000 to 2013/14 (Average) 
 
Table 1: Means and standard deviation of points accumulated and finishing position in the 
group stages of the UEFA Champions League 
Seeding pot Points Finish 
Pot 1 11.27 
(3.02) 
1.66 
(.89) 
Pot 2 9.17 
(3.57) 
2.27 
(1.02) 
Pot 3 6.95 
(3.38) 
2.88 
(1.00) 
Pot 4 5.73 
(3.45) 
3.19 
(.90) 
N.B. Standard deviation scores are presented in brackets in table 1. 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the teams in the higher seeded pots accumulate more points and a 
better finishing position in the group stages than those teams seeded in the lower pots. 
Analysis of the points accumulated and final position that clubs finished in the group stages 
of the UEFA Champions League revealed significant main effects (F(3, 476) = 63.76, p < 
.01; F(3, 476) = 60.98, p <.01). Follow up comparison of points accumulated revealed that 
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the clubs who are seeded in pot 1 accumulate more points per match than those seeded in pot 
2, 3 and 4 (p < .01). Clubs in pot 2 also accumulated more points than those in pots 3 and 4 (p 
< .01) and clubs in pot 3 accumulated more points compared with pot 4 (p < .05).  
 
In relation to the final position football clubs finished in the group stages of the UEFA 
Champions League, the clubs in pot 1 finished higher than those in pot 2, 3 and 4 (p < .01) 
and clubs in pot 2 finished higher than those in pots 3 and 4 (p < .01). There was no 
difference in final position between clubs seeded in pots 3 and 4 (p > .05).  
 
Discussion 
This current study aimed to examine the competitive balance of the UEFA Champions 
League group stages and by doing so the results suggest that the competition is imbalanced. 
Using the HHI findings representing the competitive balance of each group for each season, 
the data demonstrated that the 15 seasons have fallen into the concentrated range of business 
market share suggested as a means of identifying competitive balance. Additionally, over the 
fifteen seasons where the competition has been comprised of eight groups in the initial stages 
of the competition, the findings suggest this element is becoming more imbalanced. The 
findings of this study are in line with previous research in the area considering the 'big five' 
domestic leagues in European football (e.g., Goossens, 2006: English and Italian first 
divisions; Groot, 2008: English, German, Italian and Dutch first divisions; Montes et al., 
2014: Spanish first division) which demonstrated a decline in competitive balance. 
 
The findings also contrast with the theoretical framework put forward in the literature review 
in relation to the nature and production of professional team sports. The economic theory of 
professional team sports argues that it is not in the best interest of professional sports teams 
(from a spectator viewpoint) to form a monopoly and limit competition as this may cause 
spectator interest to decrease (e.g. Dobson and Goddard, 2011). The findings of this study 
contrast this theory somewhat in the sense that over a sustained period of time it appears that 
a number of clubs have been able to monopolise competition in the group stages of the 
Champions League. 
 
Whilst the current means of competitive balance provides a descriptive indication rather than 
a statistical analysis, the current study analysed performance by the means of points 
accumulated and final finishing position in the group stages of the competition. This analysis 
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demonstrated that this element of the competition is imbalanced and provides the teams 
selected from the stronger pots to accumulate more points and finish higher in the group 
stages than teams selected into the lower pots (seeding). This consequently leads to these 
teams having a greater chance of qualifying from the group stages for the next round of the 
competition and receiving the rewards and accolades that accompany this success. For 
example, according to UEFA's prize money distribution to clubs in 2013/14, progression to 
the round of 16 knock-out matches is worth a guaranteed €3.5m in revenue. In relation to 
competitive balance research, the study extends the field by considering statistical tests that 
specifically demonstrate that seeding impacts on the points obtained by each club and their 
respective finishing position in the group. Furthermore, to the authors' knowledge, no 
previous research has examined the UEFA Champions League competition in this way. 
 
There have been critics of UEFA's seeding system in the past, some of which have been put 
forward most recently by Bevan (2013) who argued that the system UEFA used to rank and 
then seed clubs is likely to preserve the status quo in the top seeds maintaining their high 
ranking. Bevan (2013) also notes that there is an omission of weighting to favour the most 
recent season from the seeding system, and thus, the system subsequently reflects long-term 
consistency rather than rewarding recent excellence. Furthermore, although domestic results 
are not part of the calculation, the national coefficient also counts towards each team's total 
benefiting clubs from a country with a stronger record in Europe. 
 
This subsequently means that newly qualified clubs are immediately hindered by their low 
seeding and consequently are less likely to progress in the following Champions League 
season. Additionally, due to the lower likelihood of qualifying past the group stages as they 
will face stronger teams, such clubs will also find it difficult to improve their UEFA 
coefficient thus completing a vicious circle A prime example of this is Manchester City FC 
who have won their domestic league twice in the last three seasons (2011/12 and 2013/14) 
and qualified for the group stages every year for the last 4 years (inclusive of the 2014/15 
season). Despite representing the strongest team in their domestic league on the two 
occasions where they were crowned the champions of the English Premier League, their 
seeding is lower than other English teams who have finished lower in the league but remain 
in the elite eight seeded clubs of the competition. The current study findings which 
demonstrate that teams in the stronger pot have a greater chance of qualifying past the group 
stages suggest that because of Manchester City FC's UEFA seeding, they will face tougher 
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competition to qualify to past the group stages and that ultimately they are less likely to 
progress than other teams despite being stronger than other clubs from their domestic 
competition based on recent short-term performance. 
 
A more extreme example of perceived unfairness in relation to the seeding system is Celtic 
FC. The system is heavily weighted in favour of teams from stronger nations, with each club 
receiving a fixed percentage (20% of their nation's overall coefficient to add to their own). 
The top three countries (currently Spain, England and Germany in the 2014/15 rankings) 
have four teams in the Champions League. As such, Scotland's nation ranking of 24th makes 
it increasingly difficult for Celtic to move up the club ranking system despite the club 
winning their domestic league for the last three seasons (2011/12-2013/14 inclusive). On the 
other side of the argument, the current ranking system benefits clubs such as Arsenal FC who 
remain in the top 10 of the ranking system (correct before the start of the 2014/15 
competition), and subsequently the top seeding pot, despite not finishing higher than 3rd in 
their domestic league since 2005. Thus the current system used to calculate UEFA 
coefficients that are used to seed teams leads to not only an imbalanced group stages but also 
provide the top teams with a greater opportunity to remain at the top table of the European 
competition by continually qualifying past the group stages of the competition. Teams that 
qualify reap the financial and commercial rewards that come with reaching the latter stages of 
the competition.  
 
To qualify for the strongest eight seeds of the competition, performance in UEFA 
competition for the past five seasons are calculated, thus it is extremely unlikely that teams 
will break into that elite group. The current study findings suggest five consecutive years of 
performing well in the competition are unlikely. Furthermore, attracting elite performers to a 
club who might be needed to break into the elite eight teams of the competition is also 
unlikely as: (1) players who are of that ilk would most likely be transferred to an elite club; 
(2) players generally do not stay at a club for a long enough period of time in today's game; 
and (3) because this is a large period of a football players career which again reduces the 
chances of the performer staying with the club. All of these elements act to not only prevent 
emerging teams breaking into the elite football clubs of UEFA Champions League 
competition, but also helps to maintain the high status of the elite teams.  
Limitations 
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The current study only utilises one measure of competitive balance (HHI Index) whilst in 
previous research other indicators (e.g. CBR, concentration ratios) have also been employed. 
However, owing to the nature of the group stage format of the Champions League (i.e. only 
four teams per group) other measures of competitive balance were inappropriate. 
Furthermore, unlike previous research examining competitive balance, this study uses 
statistical analysis to support the findings of the HHI index scores.  
Implications 
Our data suggests that a more thorough method of examining competitive balance is required 
particularly for a competition such as the UEFA Champions League group stages which are 
comprised of smaller groups that effect seeding positions and a random draw. As such, many 
of the indices used to measure competitive balance in previous research studies were not 
considered as relevant for this study hence why further statistical tests were carried out to 
consider the implications of the seeding system on performance. 
 
The study also has implications for UEFA and their competitions. Our data clearly suggests 
that teams seeded in higher pots finish higher in the group stages which means they 
continually progress to the more lucrative knock-out stages of the competition. There is an 
argument therefore, that a different approach to UEFA's seeding system is warranted, which  
rewards short-term performance more so that clubs gaining new successes in their domestic 
leagues are not hindered and that the status quo is not maintained owing to a five year 
ranking system. One option is to use a similar five year ranking system with weightings 
attached to each year. The largest weight would be attached to the most recent year with the 
weightings subsequently decreasing towards zero at the end of the fifth year. The weighting 
factors would then be multiplied by the points accumulated by each club through their 
performance in UEFA competitions (possibly both the Champions League and Europa 
League) to provide an overall score that rewards short-term performance more. An indicative 
example as to how this could work would be to award a weighting percentage of 75 percent 
for the most recent year (year 1) and then reduce the weightings to 60, 45, 30 and 15 percent 
for years 2-5. 
 
Not only does the current system maintain the status quo of a number of clubs in the 
Champions League, it also keeps individual leagues (namely the 'big 5' of England, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain) strong owing to the way that UEFA country co-efficient scores 
affect the individual club scores. Subsequently, these countries are awarded the largest 
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number of team places in the Champions League meaning that it becomes increasingly 
difficult for a club from outside of these countries (e.g., Celtic FC as discussed previously) to 
progress through the group stages. This argument has been offered previously (e.g., Pawloski 
et al., 2010) as well as in recent media commentary critiquing the seeding system (e.g., 
Bevan, 2013). 
 
The current study findings should also be considered in relation to other UEFA competitions 
(e.g., the European Championships). The decision to expand the competition to 24 teams for 
the Euro 2016 competition as opposed to 16 in previous years has attracted criticism and the 
proposal is viewed to devalue the competition (e.g., Winter, 2014). Increasing the number of 
teams can be beneficial for competition but it can also have implications for competitive 
balance and thus UEFA should consider carefully any proposed changes to maintain the 
integrity of their flagship competition. 
 
Conclusion 
The current study clearly demonstrates that the method used to form the UEFA Champions 
League group stages is flawed as it is not competitively balanced. Consequently, this allows 
the top-ranked teams to remain in the highest seeding pot and thus maintaining their status by 
providing these clubs with a better chance of qualification to the knock-out stages and a 
subsequent increase in prize money and global exposure. Very recently, (August, 2014) 
UEFA have proposed a new seeding system that would take affect from the 2015/2016 
Champions League campaign. Although this is yet to be approved, the impact it may have on 
competitive balance is unknown. However, on the basis of the current study's findings, and 
the fact that a new seeding system is yet to be implemented, it is clear that there remains 
work to be done in order to improve competitive balance in the UEFA Champions League. 
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